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As the military forces of the United States continue to
draw down, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are playing a
greater role across the entire spectrum of conflict. In
order to maintain its relative advantage, SOF is using
technology as a means to leverage limited resources
sometimes to the point that mission accomplishment depends
critically on a technology's availability. Adversaries will
attempt to challenge our advantages. Whether Special
Operations Forces are prepared to operate in a degraded
environment could determine success or failure.
This thesis examines the issue of critical technologies
in special operations. Critical technologies are defined
according to three variables - level of dependence, degree
of vulnerability, and substitutability . By examining
technologies against these three variables, SOF can gain a
better understanding of the impact to SOF operations if a
technical capability is lost. Three technologies are
examined to illustrate the model - the use of Radar in the
Battle of Britain, the Global Positioning System, and UHF
Satellite Communications.
By applying the model to actual cases, I hope to
encourage SOF decision-makers to closely examine our growing
reliance on vulnerable technologies as a force multiplier
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Technological advancement is a critical aspect of any
study of military operations. It is impossible to
dissociate war from the technological means of fighting war.
John H. Morse, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense,
stated, "It is more the march of technology than it is the
political decisions which drives the nature and structure of
our societies, our strategy, the nature of military forces,
their structure and the doctrine they develop" (Holmes,
1988, p. 7). Technology, in short, has played a central
role in shaping the strategy, doctrine, and organization of
military units. The longbow, repeating rifle, maxim machine
gun, airplane, tank, radar, and radio have all had a major
impact on how war has been conducted throughout the ages.
Although technology has played a vital role, it has
significant limitations. Adversaries have been very
successful in countering technological advancements and
"leveling the playing field". The Zulus against the
British, the plains Indians against General Custer, the
Vietnamese against the French and Americans, the Afghans
against the Soviets- all examples of a less sophisticated




More than ever SOF will depend on leading-edge
technology to provide the critical advantage and
to support participation in a growing number of
technologically complex and challenging missions
and operations. {SOF Posture Statement, 1998, p.
40)
Technological superiority enables small, highly
trained teams or individuals to successfully
accomplish tasks that would be too costly or
physically impossible for larger forces. {SOF
Posture Statement, 1998, p. 11)
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a unique role as a
strategic asset of the United States. The changing world
dynamics have placed SOF in a precarious position. As the
military forces of the United States continue to draw down,
SOF is playing a greater role across the entire spectrum of
conflict. Our forces are continuously using technology as a
means to leverage limited resources and USSOCOM is
especially committed to the development of new technologies
to maintain a relative advantage. Conversely, SOF must be
careful not to put too much emphasis on technologies that
could be countered by enemy action. With the proliferation
of advanced technologies in an ever-shrinking world, it is
likely that future adversaries will develop measures to
counter our advantages. We must not forget that combat is a
dynamic interaction between two opposing forces, therefore,
an advantage in capability at the beginning of a conflict
may be degraded or eliminated. Whether SOF is prepared to
operate in a degraded environment may be critical to
determining success or failure. As the previous excerpts
from the SOF Posture Statement imply, there is every
indication that SOF will continue to pursue more advanced
technologies to maintain an ^edge' . It is therefore
essential to step back and examine how new technologies are
being used, the effect of their possible loss, and develop a
means to examine when a technology becomes so important that
mission accomplishment rests on its availability.
C . PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to answer the following
questions
:
• How can we determine which technologies are critical to
Special Operations Forces?
• What are the vulnerabilities of these technologies?
• What is the potential impact on SOF if these
technologies are lost?
This thesis will develop a model that can be used to
identify technologies that are essential to SOF operations
and consider the impact of the loss of these technologies on
mission accomplishment. An additional purpose of this
effort is to encourage SOF decision-makers to closely
examine our growing reliance on technology as a force
multiplier. It should encourage commanders and operators to
look beyond the initial engagement and develop a longer term
view of warfare against an adversary with the means to
eliminate or significantly degrade our technological
advantage. The first step in this process is to define what
makes a technology critical . The following section defines
critical technologies based on three important variables.
D. DEFINING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
The idea of critical technologies is not new to the
Department of Defense. For over a decade, the DoD has been
required to submit to Congress a list of technologies that
it considers "critical to ensuring the continued qualitative
superiority of US weapons systems" (Jefferson, 1989). The
technologies that appear on this list are not specific to
any service or mission and are often very general. Some of
these technologies include microelectronics, robotics,
integrated optics, data fusion, and lightweight composite
materials
.
The main purpose of the list is to identify those
technologies that are critical to maintaining capabilities
in the future and defining those areas that require
coordination and focus of research and development efforts
(Walsh, 1997). This is where my analysis differs from the
traditional view. Instead of looking at what capabilities
will be critical in the future, this study looks at what
technological capabilities Special Operations Forces have
now that are necessary to their success.
The first step in defining critical technologies for
Special Operations Forces is to clearly specify what makes a
technology "critical". Three factors will be used to
determine criticality. The first factor is dependence. The
second factor is vulnerability. The last factor deals with
the substitutability of the technology in question. The
remainder of this section will discuss the three criteria in




The first factor in defining critical technologies for
SOF is dependence. To be considered critical, the
technology must be required to effectively perform a mission
tasking. The task may be as broad as one of the SOF
principal missions or as narrow as a Mission Essential Task
List (METL) item, as long as the METL item is essential to
the completion of the operation. Considering that much of
the technological advancements in weapon systems,
communication systems, navigation systems, and delivery
systems are rather new to SOF, dependency on a technology
has a broader meaning than initially realized. It is
obvious that if a mission cannot be performed without a
specific technology then the dependency requirement is
satisfied. The condition of dependency can also be
satisfied if the mission can be accomplished in the absence
of the technology, but much less effectively and at a much
higher risk.
Dependency, in this case, will vary by degree. For
example, a SF team is tasked to conduct a special
reconnaissance (SR) mission lasting an extended period of
time. The mission is to provide daily reports on the
mobilization of enemy forces. To effectively carry out this
mission, secure long-range communications -- the relevant
technology -- are required. Although alternate (nonsecure)
methods of communications may be available, the risk of team
compromise or mission failure significantly increases with
their use. This example illustrates an important point.
Although the recon mission can still be accomplished using a
sub-optimal technology, the condition of dependence on a
critical technology is still satisfied.
As we will see in the next chapter, the British were
very dependent on RADAR to warn of German attacks during the
Battle of Britain. Could the British have won the Battle of
Britain without RADAR? Possibly, but they would have been




The second determinate of criticality is vulnerability.
To be vulnerable means to be susceptible to attack. SOF
exploits a variety of technologies to gain a relative
advantage over an adversary. If we view war as a series of
engagements between two competent adversaries, it is obvious
that if one side has a relative advantage then the other
side will attempt to counter that advantage through whatever
means available. Therefore, SOF must be aware that the
enemy may be in a position to significantly degrade whatever
technological advantage U.S. special operations forces may
enjoy during the initial phase of the conflict.
Some technologies, of course, are more susceptible than
others are. Re-breathers used by Navy SEALs are an
essential technical item. They provide the SEALS with an
important capability necessary to complete a variety of
combat tasks. Being a completely self-contained and passive
system, the re-breather is virtually invulnerable to enemy
countermeasures . The same is true of night vision devices.
Although very important to conducting night operations,
night vision devices cannot be targeted (and, hence,
degraded) in a comprehensive manner. Each device must be
targeted individually - an almost impossible task.
Conversely, the enemy can disrupt the use of the electro-
magnetic spectrum in a variety of ways. Therefore, for the
purpose of this study, re-breathers and night vision devices
are not considered as critical technologies. Radio
communications, by contrast, are potentially vulnerable and
could be considered critical if they meet the other
criteria. For a technology to be vulnerable, it must have
an exploitable weakness, either initially or over the
duration of an extended conflict.
3 . Substitutability
The final criterion we will use to define a critical
technology is substitutability. Special Operations Forces
may be dependent on a technology that is vulnerable to enemy
action, but that technology is not considered critical if a
ready substitute is available resulting in little or no loss
of capability. Substitutability is closely related to
dependence, but they are distinct criteria. SOF is always
searching for leading-edge technologies to sustain an
advantage. Often new technologies are incorporated into SOF
operations as a supplement to, not a replacement for,
existing equipment. For example, computer-based flight
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planning systems are provided to all SOF aircrew. These
systems can reduce the amount of time required to plan a
mission and produce excellent mission aids. Although it may
take slightly longer; a map, pencil, plotter, and compass
could produce a near equivalent product. In general, actual
mission accomplishment may not be strongly affected by the
method used to plan a flight. For a technology to be
designated as critical, it must provide a unique- advantage
that cannot easily be duplicated through other means or
technologies
.
Figure 1. The Criteria of "Critical Technologies'
E. CASE SELECTION
The degree of dependence, vulnerability, and
substitutability that characterize a technology can change
based upon how the technology is used, what mission it is
used for, and who uses it. SOF currently has nine principal
missions and eight collateral activities, all of which can
involve numerous tasks that are essential to mission
success. A technology deemed critical to
counterproliferation might not be considered critical for
conducting special reconnaissance. It is clearly not
possible in this study to analyze every technology in
relation to every SOF mission task. The goal is rather to
select a technology sample that can be used to illustrate
the problem of technological "criticality" . By
concentrating on technologies that have applications across
a broad range of missions and SOF units, it will be easier
to apply lessons learned to more specific cases of single
missions or tasks. In addition to the historical case
presented in the next chapter, I have selected the Global
Positioning System and UHF Satellite Communications as
possible critical technologies for SOF. Obviously, these two
technologies are not the only possible technologies critical
for SOF, but they are current examples that illustrate the
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qualities of dependence, vulnerability, and substitutability
as they apply to SOF operations today.
The following chapter includes an historical analysis
of the Battle of Britain and the role radar played in its
successful outcome. Radar was the backbone of the British
air defense system and a critical technology for the
British. The British air defense system provided the
British with a relative advantage over the superior German
Air Force, but it was a fragile advantage. Even though
vulnerable to enemy attack, radar was the only technology
available to provide the British with adequate warning of
German attacks. The three criteria of critical technologies
dependence, vulnerability, and substitutability - are
presented in the following important historical example.
11
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II. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
A. INTRODUCTION
It is undisputed that advances in technology have
played an essential role in the conduct of conflict
throughout the ages. There are obviously countless
technological advancements, some mentioned in the previous
chapter, that have shaped war and changed history in the
process, but there is one technological advancement that is
often overlooked - Radio Detection and Ranging, more
commonly known as Radar. Some form of radar is used in
almost every major weapon system, from airplanes, to ships,
to range finders on individual tanks. David Fisher (1988),
author of A Race on the Edge of Time: Radar - The Decisive
Weapon of World War II, states, "Taken all in all, radar
must be the most important scientific/ political/ military
invention of them all, bar none" (p. xi) . Although this
statement may be contested, it is clear that radar has
played a significant role in warfare.
Radar was first used by the British during World War II
to detect German aircraft approaching England. The early
warning of German attacks provided by the British radar
system proved essential to preventing the German invasion of
England. An examination of the use of radar before and
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during the Battle of Britain provides an excellent example
of a critical technology. The three criteria of dependence,
vulnerability, and substitutability are clearly demonstrated
by this well documented case.
B . BACKGROUND
In just two short years, Hitler's Germany had gained
control of most of the European continent. Czechoslovakia,
Austria, Poland, Belgium, Holland, and France were all under
German control. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF)
,
along with over 100,000 French troops were isolated around
the port of Dunkirk on the Franco-Belgian border (Clark,
1966) . Under immense German pressure, the BEF and French
forces were forced to flee across the English Channel,
relinquishing the last stronghold on the continent. With
the signing of the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany
and Russia, only one country remained successfully at war
with Germany - Great Britain. Realizing that Britain would
not come to terms like the French, "the invasion and
subjugation of Britain therefore became essential to the
Germans" (Clark, 1966, p. 23)
.
Both the British and the Germans learned valuable
lessons during Hitler's campaigns of 1939 and 1940. One
very important lesson was the value of airp wer. The rapid
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and overwhelming success of German ground operations relied
heavily on the Luftwaffe's support for advancing ground
forces. German bombers were very effectively employed as
long range artillery in direct support of the army.
However, in order for the bombers to successfully conduct
attacks in daylight they had to be protected by fighter
escorts (Clark, 1966) . Air superiority became a necessary
condition for a ground campaign - a point clearly
demonstrated at Dunkirk.
The rescue of the BEF and French forces at Dunkirk
relied on a number of things, one of which was the lack of
German air superiority over the Dunkirk beaches (Clark,
1966) . Allied planes flying out of France and England were
able to effectively engage the Luftwaffe, slow the German
ground offensive, and allow retreating British and French
forces to cross the channel to England in everything from
fishing boats to private yachts.
The Germans knew that in order to successfully cross
the channel and conduct an invasion of England, command of
the air had to be achieved. "All that remained to be done
before the great venture started was to gain control of the
air. Without that, as the Germans well knew, they were
unlikely to get ashore, let alone stay there" (Clark, 1966,
p. 131) . For Operation Sea Lion (the code name assigned to
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the German plan to invade England) to commence, the
Luftwaffe had to neutralize British Fighter Command.
Fighter Command was a formidable force. Developed over
nearly two decades, Fighter Command was well organized and
committed solely to the defense of England. However,
defeating the German Luftwaffe would not be an easy task.
The "Battle of Britain", whose outcome would determine the
future course of WW II, was fought with Germany's Luftwaffe
having a distinct numerical advantage over Britain' s Fighter
Command.
1 . The Prefight Numbers
By the summer of 1940 -- the start of the Battle of
Britain -- the British were outnumbered in frontline
aircraft two to one. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had
approximately 2900 aircraft of all types, the Luftwaffe over
4,500 (Posen, 1984); hardly the best of odds for a nation
now isolated from the European continent and fighting solo
against the formidable German war machine. Looking more
closely at the numbers reveals a clearer, yet darker
picture
.
"Single-engine, single-seat fighters were the key
element of both forces" (Posen, 1984, p. 94). The fighters
were the aircraft that determined which side had command of
the air. Without command of the skies, bombers were much
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less effective and ground forces were susceptible to attack
from enemy aircraft. Throughout the battle, Britain was
able to close the gap, especially in fighters, but never
approached a numerical advantage. Even at the peak of RAF
size, between 550 and 650 British Hurricanes and Spitfires
faced some 1,700 German fighters and bombers (Posen)
.
The qualitative difference was not nearly as great as
the quantitative difference between the Luftwaffe and RAF.
In fact, the Luftwaffe and RAF planes were quite evenly
matched (Mosley, 1977). The British Spitfire and German Bf
109 were the best aircraft and their performance
capabilities were very similar. British Hurricanes were a
bit inferior and the Bf 110s were the worst. Even with
somewhat evenly matched aircraft, the overall qualitative
advantage was still with the Germans. The number of
Spitfires seldom was over 250 and usually closer to only
200. The Germans had over 600 Bf 109s (Posen, 1984).
Quality and quantity of aircraft was not the only issue
facing the RAF at the start of the Battle of Britain.
The RAF was also plagued with a shortage of pilots.
The British lost nearly 300 pilots over France and Belgium
in just the few weeks of war on the continent (Clark, 1966)
.
Most of the men lost were experienced aviators. In
contrast, the Germans had a large pool of experienced
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pilots, combat tested over Poland and Western Europe. The
British could only effectively train sixty-five pilots a
month, sometimes not keeping up with combat losses (Clark)
.
Luckily, since the Battle of Britain was almost exclusively
fought over England, RAF pilots could parachute or crash-
land on friendly soil enabling them to be back in action
rather quickly. This proved essential to maintaining enough
experienced pilots to fly the planes (Mosley, 1977). Yet,
there must have been some further reason why the British
were able to overcome the Germans' qualitative and
quantitative advantages. The answer is radar.
2 . The Chain-Home System
Early warning was one of the most important keys
to victory. Without it the quality of the
machines, the training of the pilots, or the
courage with which they fought against such heavy
odds would hardly have availed. (Clark, 1966, p.
116)
The British knew that their country was becoming
increasingly vulnerable as aircraft cruise speeds tripled
and bombing capabilities increased at an exponential rate.
No longer could the British rely solely on visual warning to
prepare for an impending attack. The idea that an aircraft
could be detected by using radio waves had not even been
thought of just five years before radar's decisive use
against the Germans in 1940. The development of radar in
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such a short period of time is an indication of the
ingenuity of key individuals in the British scientific
community. One such individual is Watson Watt - generally
regarded as the father of radar (Fisher, 1988). Watt was
the first to suggest that radio beams could be used to
detect aircraft and was instrumental in designing and
building the extensive radar system that spanned the entire
east and south coast of England. The technology of radar
was vital to the British, but was only one part of a much
larger system that made up the air defense network.
The protection of England depended on an intricate web
of radio towers, receiver stations and control centers.
Twenty-one radio towers and control centers were established
to maintain unbroken coverage along the entire coast. Each
control center was directly linked to a single Fighter
Command "Filter" center that consolidated the information
and resolved any discrepancies in center reporting. The
Filter center then passed the information on to the Group
Headquarters which allocated the targets and controlled the
intercepts with the aid of the control centers at each
"Chain Home" site (Posen, 1984). The Chain Home system
could detect aircraft over 100 miles out and even determine
the relative size of the German formations giving Fighter
Command the ability to scramble the proper number of fighter
19
squadrons to intercept the intruders. The controllers could
even determine aircraft elevation. Altitude indications,
however, were still much less reliable than azimuth and
distance information (Fisher, 1988).
C. RADAR AS A CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY
The Luftwaffe had to obtain command of the air over the
channel and along the coastal regions of England to execute
a successful landing during Operation Sea Lion. The only
thing that could prevent German command of the air was
Fighter Command, therefore, the survival of Fighter Command
was paramount for the British. After evaluating radar
against the three criteria of critical technologies
dependence, vulnerability, and substitutability - it is easy
to see how important radar was to Britain's success. Radar





Fighter Command knew an invasion loomed but
did not have the fuel or planes to maintain the
standing patrols in anticipation of enemy raids.
Nor did the country have the time to breed another
crop of brave and intelligent young men if German
bombers surprised planes and pilots on the ground.
The nation' s best hope for hanging on rested on
being able to spot the Luftwaffe far out over the
English Channel and then deploying its thin
resources to meet the threat at hand. On this
vital front, everything depended on the Chain Home
radar network. (Buderi, 1996, p. 89)
The above quote from Robert Buderi in, The Invention
that Changed the World, summarizes why the British were so
dependent on radar. England, at the nearest point, was only
twenty-two miles from German controlled territory. Launched
from bases on the coast of France and Belgium and travelling
over 250 mph, German aircraft could be over the southwest
coast of England in minutes. The British were outnumbered
and suffered from a shortage of pilots. It was not possible
to continuously have enough aircraft airborne to counter a
German attack, nor were there enough pilots to maintain the
very short alert response times required if the British had
to rely on visual sighting of German aircraft crossing the
coast.
The RAF could ill afforded to allow the Germans to
surprise them and destroy the aircraft on the ground. The
only way Fighter Command could both fight and survive was to
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husband their resources and engage the Germans only on terms
favorable to the British. The British depended on radar to
provide adequate warning of German intentions so that the
minimum number of aircraft could be launched from the right
airfields at the right time. Due to limited fuel reserves,
an early launch could be just as disastrous as a late
launch. Only with radar were the controllers on the ground
able to place the defending squadrons where they could do
the most good (Clark, 1966)
.
2 . Vulnerability
The twenty-one Chain Home stations on which the British
depended were quite vulnerable to enemy attack. Each
station consisted of a tall metal or wooden antenna tower, a
control center that housed the radarscopes, and the living
quarters of the radar operators. The German targeted the
towers but found them very difficult to hit due to their
size and construction (Clark, 1966) . The achillies heel of
the stations was the control centers and living quarters.
The highly trained personnel manning the stations, so
essential to its operation, were largely unprotected from
enemy attack. The work centers and quarters were often
•flimsy wooden huts, hastily camouflaged, yet still easily
visible to enemy bombers (Mosley, 1977). Luckily, the
Germans did not realize the importance of the buildings
22
surrounding the towers and never mounted a significant
campaign against them. Stations were hit periodically and
taken out of action, but the Germans never effectively
exploited the subsequent gaps in the radar coverage.
Toward the end of the Battle of Britain, the Germans
did try to minimize the advantages of British radar by
altering their tactics. The Luftwaffe would precede their
bomber attacks with large fighter sweeps near the French
coast in an attempt to confuse the radar operators and force
the British fighters to launch unnecessarily. Numerous
feint attacks would be followed by the main attack, with the
goal of catching the British squadrons off balance and low
on fuel (Clark, 1966) . Using these tactics, the Germans
began to inflict heavier losses on Fighter Command.
Fortunately for the Allies, these tactics were developed too
late in the campaign to affect the outcome.
The survival and continued effectiveness of the British
radar system was not due to its invulnerability. The entire
system was actually quite vulnerable and was successfully
attacked, although often by accident. Radar's continued
existence had much to do with a German intelligence failure.
The Germans could never obtain enough information to find
the radar system's physical weaknesses and did not develop
23
the tactics necessary to defeat the radar system'
s
operational weaknesses until it was too late.
3 . Substitutability
Substitutability is the final criterion that defines
radar as a critical technology for the British in the Battle
of Britain. It is clear that early warning of German
operations was absolutely essential to the outnumbered RAF
to succeed. It was a critical force multiplier. Although
other methods of detection were attempted, radar was the
only technology available at the time that could provide the
advantage required to keep Fighter Command in the game.
Although radar did prove successful, using radio waves to
detect aircraft was not the only method the British tried.
Sound detection was the first method tried to warn of
approaching aircraft.
The first attempt to detect aircraft at long ranges
was with sound waves. The key to the system was an
acoustically molded wall 200 feet long and 25 feet wide.
Imbedded in the wall were numerous extremely sensitive
microphones. It was envisioned that a vast system of
directional microphones would detect airplanes far before
the airplane came into view (Fisher, 1988). The tests
proved to be a failure. The scientists found that any
extraneous noise affected the accuracy of the devices.
24
Another problem was with the physics of sound. Considering
that sound travels at only 700 miles per hour (only about
twice the speed of the bombers), by the time the sound
reflected from the plane and was received by the
microphones, the aircraft were no longer where the sound
detectors indicated (Fisher).
An obvious solution was airborne surveillance to detect
the launch and formation of German air elements over the
continent. This tactic, however, was also out of the
question. First, the RAF did not have the manpower or
equipment to support continual surveillance. Second, it
would be very hard for the airborne surveillance aircraft to
effectively cover all the possible German airbases because
they would have to maintain visual contact with each one.
Lastly, surveillance aircraft would have been very
vulnerable to German fighters over the enemy bases. It is
clear that radar was the only effective means to provide the
required warning so essential to Britain' s eventual success




The summer of 1940 was a desperate time for the
British. The Germans controlled much of the coast of
25
Western Europe and were preparing for the invasion of
England. In order to ensure a successful channel crossing
the Germans had to have command of the air. The only thing
that stood in Germany's path was Great Britain's Fighter
Command. Considering the Germans' qualitative and
quantitative advantages, the defeat of Fighter Command
should have been no problem for the experienced Luftwaffe.
Radar, a critical technology for the British, allowed
an out-gunned and out-numbered force to achieve a relative
advantage and ultimately succeed against the German
onslaught. Radar easily satisfies the three criteria
outlined in the previous chapter. The British depended on
radar to warn of German bombing raids enabling Fighter
Command to selectively launch only those squadrons necessary
to meet the approaching threat and protect their aircraft
from being attacked while on the ground. Only with radar
could the British husband their scarce resources and survive
through the summer. Although not fully exploited by the
Germans, radar was quite vulnerable by direct attack of the
control centers and by tactical deception. Lastly, radar
was the only thing available that could give the British the
advantage they needed to survive the Battle of Britain.
26
III. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years men have been navigating this
planet by a variety of ingenious means. A navigational
technique developed by the ancient Polynesians is the use of
natural stars (Parkinson & Spilker, 1996) . This method
involved triangulating your position from the known location
of the stars. After the development of radio technology,
new methods of navigation were introduced. These methods
included radio beacons, Vhf Omnidirectional Radios (VORs)
,
and LOng-range RAdio Navigation (LORAN) (Parkinson &
Spilker) . Much like navigating by the stars, radio
navigation involved finding one's relative position in
reference to a known position - in this case a radio
transmitter. Both of these systems had significant
drawbacks. To navigate using the stars, the weather had to
be clear enough to see them. To navigate using radio
beacons, the user had to be within line-of-sight of the
transmitter which limited the range of operations. With the
introduction of artificial satellites, both of these
'limitations seemed to have been solved.
Artificial satellites made possible a revolution in
navigation. Instead of using angular measurements to
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natural stars, a plan was developed by a small group in the
Department of Defense to use ranging measurements from
artificial stars (satellites) to greatly improve accuracy
and virtually eliminate the problems of line-of-sight caused
by natural and man-made obstructions. This led to the birth
of the Global Positioning System, more commonly referred to
as GPS.
The Global Positioning System was developed by the US
Department of Defense for military users. It took over two
decades and ten billion dollars to deploy the twenty-seven
satellite system (Pace et al., 1995). The benefits of GPS
are enormous. GPS provides highly accurate navigation and
positioning for a variety of military equipment, including
aircraft, ships, land vehicles, and most recently precision-
guided munitions (PGMs) . US forces have come to rely
heavily on uninterrupted access to GPS as it has emerged as
an integral component of almost every military system. A
recent RAND report states that, "The US military is moving
toward high reliance on GPS, and force structure decisions
are being made that assume GPS availability" (Pace et al.,
1995, p. xvii). For example, Congress has ordered that any
aircraft, ship, armored vehicle, or indirect-fire weapon not
equipped with GPS after the year 2000 will not be funded
(Pace et al.). These developments carry obvious benefits,
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but there are risks as well. The more reliant we become on
a continuous GPS signal, the more vulnerable we are when
that signal is disrupted. The military, furthermore, is not
the only organization that is increasingly relying on GPS
coverage
.
Although GPS was developed to meet military needs, the
commercial uses of GPS are expanding at an ever-increasing
rate. GPS is used extensively in civil aviation and some
organizations are pushing to have GPS as the single source
navigation system for all civil aviation due to its low cost
and versatility (Corrigan et al., 1999). Besides basic land
and marine navigation, other civilian uses of GPS include
mapping and surveying, construction, wildlife management,
resource exploration, space operations, and law enforcement
(Aerospace Corporation, 1999) . The hot new items in cars
are moving map displays and vehicle tracking options - all
made possible by GPS technology. One area that is rapidly
expanding is the use of GPS time data. Accurate timing is
essential for the seamless routing of "information packets"
in communications systems and computer networks. GPS is the
most cost-effective and efficient method to deliver
precision time "stamps" so essential to the increased data
rates of modern communication networks (Pace et al., 1995).
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B . BACKGROUND
The theory behind GPS is quite simple - triangulation
from known satellite positions -- but the actual working of
the system is much more complex. To understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the GPS system, a more detailed
examination of how and why the system works is required.
1 . GPS Segments
The Global Positioning System consists of three major
segments: Space, Control, and User. All three segments are
critical to the proper functioning of the entire system.
The first element of the GPS system, the Space segment,
consists of the actual satellites orbiting the earth.
Currently, there are twenty-four operational satellites and
three spares that provide continuous worldwide coverage
(Pace et al., 1995). The satellites are arranged in three
circular rings spaced evenly about the equator at an orbital
altitude of 10,980 NM. Providing a minimum of six
satellites in view at any time (and a maximum of eleven)
,
the system is robust in that it could tolerate occasional
satellite outages (Parkinson & Spilker, 1996) . To get
accurate position and time information, only four satellites
are required. Additionally, the current configuration of
three orbital rings allows three spares to replace any
single failure in the whole system (Parkinson & Spilker)
.
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The satellites, once launched, are not autonomous. They
require periodic updates to ensure accurate data is provided
to the user.
The second element of GPS is the Control segment. The
control segment consists of the Operational Control Center
and five monitor stations. The Operational Control Center
is located at Schriever Air Force Base (formerly Falcon AFB)
in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The five monitor stations
are located at Hawaii, Colorado Springs, Ascension Island,
Diego Garcia, and at Kwajalein Island in the West Pacific.
The Control Segment is responsible for the following
functions: maintaining the proper position of the satellites
through small commanded maneuvers, performing adjustments
and corrections to the satellite clocks and payload,
tracking the satellites and uploading the required
navigation data, and finally relocating satellites in the
event of a satellite's failure (Parkinson & Spilker, 1996).
Without monitoring from the control segment, the accuracy of
the system cannot be maintained.
The User Segment is the last major element of GPS. It
consists of GPS receivers and the user community. GPS
receivers convert the signals from the satellites to
position, velocity, and time estimates. Four satellites are
necessary to accurately compute the four dimensions of X, Y,
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Z (position) and Time (Dana, 1999) . Generally, the
receivers track more satellite signals than the four
required. By tracking more than four satellites, position
accuracy can be maintained as satellites move out of view of
the receiver. This is especially important for airborne GPS
receivers due to the relative high velocities in all three
dimensions. On the other hand, land and marine GPS
navigation can operate for limited periods on only two or
three satellites (Parkinson & Spilker, 1996)
.
The Space, Control, and User segments of GPS cover the
hardware of the system, but just as important -- especially
if we are to consider the vulnerability of GPS -- is the
actual signal that the satellites transmit. The following
is a brief overview of the GPS signal, how it is controlled,
and the difference in the signal provided for military
operations and the signal provided for civilian use.
2 . GPS Signal
To better understand GPS and how the signal can be
vulnerable to unintentional or intentional interference, we
need to examine the intricacies of the signal transmitted by
the satellites. GPS satellites transmit two distinct
signals. The first is the Coarse Acquisition or C/A code.
Designed for use by nonmilitary users, the C/A code provides
the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) . The C/A code is
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less accurate, easier to acquire, and easier to jam (Pace et
al., 1995). The code signal and navigation message for SPS
is carried on the LI frequency (1575.42 MHz). The C/A code
modulates the LI carrier signal and spreads the signal over
a 1 MHz bandwidth spectrum (Dana, 1999) . The accuracy of
the SPS signal is intentionally downgraded by the Department
of Defense by the use of Selective Availability (S/A) . With
selective availability, the SPS signal will provide at least
100 meter horizontal accuracy, 140 meter vertical accuracy,
and 340 nanosecond time accuracy (Parkinson & Spilker,
1996) .
The second signal provided by the satellite to the user
is the Precision or P-code. Designed for authorized
military users only, the P-code provides the Precise
Positioning Service (PPS) (Pace et al., 1995). PPS data is
transmitted on the LI frequency and an additional L2
frequency. The L2 frequency (1227.60 MHz), the P-code, is
provided to measure time delays between the two signals
providing greater position accuracy. In addition, the L2
signal is spread over a 10 MHz bandwidth spectrum (Dana,
1999) . The PPS accuracy is as low as 22 meter horizontal
accuracy, 27.7 meter vertical accuracy, and a 100 nanosecond
time accuracy - a significant improvement over the SPS code
with Selective Availability activated (US Naval Observatory,
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1998). The P-code is more difficult to acquire, therefore,
current military GPS receivers first track the less accurate
C/A code and then transfer to the P-code (Pace et al.,
1995)
.
The PPS code can be denied to unauthorized users by
cryptography. The DoD has the ability to encrypt a segment
of the P-code. This technique is called anti-spoof ing (AS)
(Pace et al., 1995) . Spoofing is a type of jamming in which
a false signal is transmitted in an attempt to duplicate the
real signal. The goal is for the receiver to track the
false signal, thereby inducing errors in the navigation
solution. When anti-spoof ing is activated, the normal P-
code is replaced by the Y-code, commonly referred to as the
P(Y)-code (US Naval Observatory, 1998). To realize the
accuracy of the Precise Positioning Service in the anti-
spoofing mode of operation, the user requires a classified
AS module for each receiver channel and the proper
cryptographic keys (Dana, 1999).
This brief overview of how GPS works only scratches the
surface of a highly technical and complex system. Much more
about the signal characteristics of GPS will be discussed
.when GPS vulnerability is examined later in this chapter.
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C. GPS AS A CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY
GPS is rapidly becoming the standard means of
navigation for almost every military platform. It would be
hard to find a soldier, sailor, or airman who does not have
at least some experience with GPS. The enormous growth of
GPS started in the Gulf War. The featureless terrain and
the long and rapid movements made navigating in the desert
extremely difficult. It quickly became apparent that GPS
provided a distinct advantage. With GPS, Coalition forces
were able to navigate at night and in adverse conditions
when the Iraqi troops who lived there could not. The demand
for GPS receivers was so great that more than 9000
commercial receivers were purchased and used in the Gulf by
everyone from foot soldiers to aircrews (Aerospace
Corporation, 1999) . SOF units were some of the first and
only units to have a GPS capability at the start of the war.
The 20 th Special Operations Squadron, flying the MH-53J
PAVELOW helicopter, started the air war when members led a
flight of Apache helicopters across the desert at night to
destroy selected Iraqi air defense sites and blow a hole in
the Iraqi air defense system for the Coalition Air Force.
The MH-53Js got the job because they were the only
helicopters in the theater with the navigation system (GPS
included) capable of the precise navigation and exact timing
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the mission demanded. SOF has always been a leader in the
development and use of new technologies and GPS is no
exception. The question now remains whether GPS is a
"critical technology" for SOF in the manner in which this
concept has been previously defined. To answer this
question, the three criteria of dependence, vulnerability,
and substitutability are examined below.
1 . Dependence
It is obvious that GPS usage by SOF, as well as the
entire Department of Defense, has risen dramatically in the
last decade, but has SOF become dependent on GPS to
accomplish its mission? The level of dependency on any
current technology is difficult to quantify. Operators are
often unwilling to admit their success relies on a single
piece of gear and this is generally true. Mission success
is seldom determined by the availability of a single
technology, but mission effectiveness and level of risk can
be impacted by a single technology. Realizing that
dependency is not clearly quantifiable, dependency on GPS
must be established subjectively. In order to accomplish
this task, I have reviewed the navigation equipment carried
by various SOF units and how the equipment is used in the
field. The following information was compiled from informal
interviews with SOF operators. The data do not reflect how
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GPS would be used for each of the wide range of missions
various SOF units may be required to perform, but rather
provides a broad snapshot of GPS use.
A few general trends are readily apparent when
examining GPS use by SOF units. It is obvious that terrain
and speed of maneuver have a significant impact on the level
of dependency on GPS. The more featureless the terrain -
such as desert, open water, dense foliage - the greater the
reliance on alternate forms of navigation. Also, the faster
the movement and the greater the distance covered the more
opportunity there is for error, especially when allowable
'time on target' tolerances are plus or minus thirty
seconds, or less. A review of the equipment carried by
various SOF units will provide insight into the level of
dependence on GPS
.
SOF aviation is one of the primary users of GPS
technologies. All SOF aviation assets currently have on-
board GPS units. On some airframes, such as the two
versions of the H-6 'Little Bird' , the only on board
navigation systems are GPS and LORAN (Jackson, 1998) . All
SOF MC-130 aircraft and most of the SOF helicopters have GPS
integrated with inertial navigation systems (INS). The GPS
provides nearly continuous updates to the INS to provide the
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best navigation solution. In other words, the GPS is always
on and providing vital input to the navigation systems.
Ground units also carry GPS units on a regular basis.
Special Forces (SF) teams carry GPS units on all mission
activities. The number of GPS units carried varies based on
mission, eguipment load, and team preference. An SFODA can
carry as many as three GPS units for navigational
assistance. The majority of SF units are using the Rockwell
AN/PSN-11 Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System
i'PLGR). GPS units are also mounted on the various vehicles
used by SF teams.
The US Air Force Special Tactics Sguadrons (STS) and
the Navy SEALs also carry the PLGR for navigation. Much
like SF, the number of GPS units carried depends on team
size and mission tasking, but GPS units are always carried -
usually more than one per team. Multiple units are
regularly carried to provide redundancy should a unit fail.
Most SEAL units are also equipped with the Miniature
Underwater Global Positioning System Receiver (MUGR)
manufactured by the Trimble Corporation. The MUGR weights
less than twenty ounces and is designed to operate to a
water depth of 33 feet (Williamson, 1998).
The different SOF units rely on GPS to varying degrees.
This is evident by the type of training conducted and the
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mission environment. Of all the SOF components surveyed, US
Army Special Forces appear to be the least dependent on GPS
technology for overall mission accomplishment. This fact
reflects a combination of mission environment and training.
As previously stated, the level of reliance varies
significantly with the type of terrain and method of
movement. Walking patrols tend to use the GPS only as a
backup at irregular intervals, whereas vehicle mounted
patrols tend to have a much greater reliance.
SF units do train without GPS availability on a
recurring basis. All initial training is accomplished
without the aid of GPS and each member is required to
demonstrate his basic land navigation 1 skills during
recertification exercises that are conducted each year.
SEALs also conduct initial navigation training without
the use of GPS and some recurring training is conducted
using only basic navigation skills, but on a much less
structured basis. There is no formal requirement such as
yearly recertification . The maritime environment, due to
the lack of navigation reference points, lends itself to
greater reliance on GPS as a continuous source of
1 Basic land navigation involves navigating using only a
map, compass, stopwatch, etc. No outside signal is sent or
received by the user to aid in position determination.
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navigation. On land, by contrast, GPS is used more as a
position verification tool. The same is true for STS units,
although STS appears to train even less without GPS
availability than other SOF units.
Lastly, SOF aviation assets use GPS on a near
continuous basis. GPS is fully integrated into the
navigation systems of the aircraft and provide continuous
input. Training without GPS is normally only conducted on
training flights involving upgrades to a higher crew
qualification or on evaluation flights.
Although the various aspects of SOF do train to varying
degrees without the aid of GPS navigation, no known joint
special operations exercise has been conducted that required
all participants to conduct operations without the aid of
GPS navigation. It is readily apparent that training
without GPS is only done unilaterally at the unit or service
component level, if conducted at all. Additionally, the
longer SOF successfully uses GPS and the more comfortable
operators become using and trusting GPS, the greater the
impact will be should the GPS signal be lost.
2 . Vulnerability
The Global Positioning System satellites may be
orbiting at 11,000 miles above the earth and out of reach of
most weapons, but there is a weakness of GPS that is
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potentially vulnerable to enemy exploitation. The most
vulnerable aspect of GPS is the navigation and timing
signals coming from the satellite to the receivers on the
ground or in the air. Like any other radio signal, GPS
signals have the potential of being disrupted. These
disruptions can be unintentional or intentional and can
seriously degrade the quality of signal reaching the GPS
receivers. GPS signals are more susceptible to interference
than ground based navigation systems due to the relatively
weak signal strength of GPS. The satellites provide a
signal whose power level is -160 dBW (160 decibels below a




Unintentional interference of GPS navigation
signals can come from a variety of sources. Layers of the
atmosphere, especially the ionosphere and troposphere, can
interfere with GPS signals and produce errors in receiver
accuracy (Parkinson & Spilker, 1996). Additionally,
commercial very high frequency (VHF) radio transmitters can
drown-out the weak GPS signals and cause loss of
navigational data (Corrigan et al . , 1999). Lastly, certain
television transmissions can cause similar difficulties.
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Television stations often use very high power transmitters
compared to GPS signal strength. Three television channels,
channels 23, 66, and 67, all have harmonics that fall within
the LI band and their power levels are much stronger than
that of the GPS signal (Corrigan et al.). The interference
caused by VHF and television transmitters is generally
intermittent and localized, therefore, the threat to GPS
navigation is not significant. However, the fact that GPS
can be disrupted by common signals does give us some insight
into the possible effectiveness of the intentional
disruption of GPS signals by an adversary intent on
degrading US military capability.
b) Intentional Interference
It is well know that the GPS signal is very weak,
and, assuming a standard GPS receiver, a small
level of noise in the GPS band can disrupt
reception over tens or even hundreds of miles.
(Corrigan et al. , 1999)
Considering the relative weakness of the GPS
signal, noise jamming - a more pervasive threat than
spoofing - can be very effective. "This approach [noise
jamming] attempts to overwhelm a GPS receiver (by brute
force) with radio noise" (Pace et al., 1995, p. 49). Either
wide-band jamming or narrow-band jamming can be employed.
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Wide-band jamming is much more effective, especially against
military users, because jammer noise can be spread across
the entire bandwidth of the P-code making the jamming
difficult to counter (Pace et al., 1995). Jamming
effectiveness depends on jamming power, range to receiver,
and receiver characteristics.
To analyze the possible threat of GPS jamming, The
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in its
GPS Risk Assessment Study (1999) developed a model to
compare the estimated cost and size of a jammer vis-a-vis
jammer power. Most of the parts required to build an
effective jammer are readily available. An inexpensive
frequency source, solid state transmitter, power supply, and
onmi-directional antenna are all easily obtained. Only the
frequency source is not readily available and must be
specifically ordered (Corrigan et al.). Table 3.1, taken
directly from the report, shows the estimated cost, weight,
and volume of jammers at varying power levels. A 100W
jammer designed to operate for a full day would only cost
slightly over $400 and be the size of a small suitcase. The
effect of such a small and inexpensive jammer is illustrated
in Figure 3.1, also from the Johns Hopkins University's
report. The shaded area of Figure 3.1 shows the area of
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disruption of GPS C/A code signals at various flight
altitudes caused by a 100W jammer. Depending on the
















10 50 1 50 60 11 250
100 300 3 500 409 112 2500
1000 3000 10 5000 4090 1100 25000
Table 3.1 GPS Jammer Characteristics From Ref. Corrigan et
al., 1999, p. 5-6.
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Figure 3.1 Outage Area Caused by a 100-W Jammer From Ref.
Corrigan et al., 1999, p. 5-7.
There is more to the GPS jamming threat than just
numbers and electronic theory. A portable GPS jammer is
already on the market. Aviaconversia, a Russian electronics
firm, displayed a GPS jammer at Moscow Air '97. According
to Aviation Week and Space Technology (Sept, 1997), "the 4W
jammer will interfere with civil and military frequencies
out to a range of 200km (108 mi.)" (Nordwall, p. 56). The
jammer can be powered by batteries or 230 volts d.c. and
weights only 18-26 lb. The next generation jammer is
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expected to be 50% smaller and lighter. Aviaconversia
claims to have several potential customers in the Middle
East (Nordwall, 1997) . The Russians are not the only ones
developing this technology.
The Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, CA. , has
also developed a prototype GPS jammer. Twenty devices have
been built in a variety of shapes - some as small as a Coke
can. According to W. Mark Henderson, an electronic systems
engineer from China Lake, the devices could be produced for
as little as $250 (Nordwall, 1998)
.
The threat of jamming and the proliferation of
jamming technology are not the end to GPS. Antenna design,
receiver design, and increased signal strength are all
techniques to mitigate the effects of jamming. There is
already one method that decreases the threat of jamming -
the use of receivers that are capable of receiving and
encrypting the P(Y) code. Figure 3.2, taken from an article
by Stanley Alterman (1995) in the Journal of Electronic
Defense, clearly illustrates the effectiveness of using the
P(Y) code and antenna design techniques. By examining the
chart, we see that just a " 1W jammer located 60 km away
(line-of-sight ) can prevent a well-designed GPS receiver
using C/A-code from acquiring satellites" (p. 54). In
contrast, a well-designed military receiver locked on to the
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P(Y) code requires a 100 W jammer just 20 km away to disrupt
the receiver (Alterman) . Figure 3.2 also shows the
advantages of antenna designs on jamming effectiveness. One
type of adaptive antenna is the controlled radiation pattern
antenna (CRPA) . CRPA provides 20 to 30-dB jamming/signal
rejection. A special nulling concept currently being
developed can provide up to 50-dB jamming/ signal rejection
(Alterman)
.
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Figure 3.2 GPS Calculations From Ref. Alterman, 1995, p
54.
GPS signals are vulnerable and becoming more
vulnerable as companies such as Aviaconversia and others
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develop cheaper and smaller jammers. As we have just seen,
these current jammers can be defeated, but is SOF
effectively using these techniques to minimize their
exposure to intentional interference of the GPS signals?
The following paragraphs hope to answer this question.
As previously noted, GPS vulnerability can be
reduced through the proper use of encryption which permits
use of the P(Y) code which not only increases accuracy, but
is harder to jam once the P(Y) code is acquired. By
sampling SF, STS, SEAL, and SOF aviation units, I have found
that all the units surveyed have access to and use GPS units
designed for military use, therefore, have the ability to
receive the P(Y) code. There are individuals who carry
commercial GPS units as part of their personal gear, but I
found no indication that the commercial units were being
used as a primary navigation aid; they are only carried for
personal use in an emergency or survival situation.
Although SOF units have access to military GPS units capable
of encryption, are the operators taking advantage of this
added capability?
Overall, SOF units are taking advantage of the
.added capability of encryption to receive the P(Y) code.
Most of the operators interviewed stated that the units used
in the field are usually keyed. Although it appears that
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the GPS units are generally keyed, there is no indication
that this is required in accordance with standard operating
procedures or regulations. In addition, the operators are
not fully aware of the importance of obtaining and
maintaining the P-code during operations. Most operators
were aware of increased accuracy, but most were not aware of
the increased anti-jam capabilities that the P-code
provided. By not realizing the full advantage of the
encrypted GPS signal, less emphasis may be placed on proper
encryption, possibly undermining the mission should jamming
become a factor.
3 . Substitutability
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, man has
been successfully navigating the globe thousands of years
before the advent of GPS. This being true, it would appear
that GPS is easily substituted by using older, tried and
true navigation techniques. However, it is not so easy.
The modern battlefield environment demands a level of
precision and timeliness that is unmatched by any other
period in modern history. Modern military operations can
require timing to the second and position accuracy to the
meter. At the moment, only GPS can provide this capability.
In addition, SOF units do not have the luxury of picking the
environment in which they operate. Desert operations and
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extended maritime operations are just two environments that
can exceed the capabilities of even the best trained
operators using no navigation aids besides map and compass
techniques
.
Currently few navigational techniques can provide the
accuracy of GPS navigation for the majority of SOF units.
For most SOF land and sea based units, GPS is the only
realistic alternative currently available that can provide
the required accuracy in all environments. There are
alternatives to GPS, but accuracy is sacrificed and
complexity is usually increased. Ground-based navigation
aids and inertial navigation systems are two alternatives,
but each has significant limitations for many applications.
Many SOF aviation assets, and some SEAL boat units have
the capability to use some of the ground based navigation
systems previously mentioned such as VORs, TACANs or LORAN
.
Although many of the assets are equipped to navigate using
these systems, it is unrealistic to assume that these
systems will be available in the conflict's area of
operation. If an enemy can jam GPS signals, they can jam
ground based navigation systems. In addition, these systems
lack the accuracy required and are limited by line-of-sight
Another possible substitute, especially for aviation assets,
is inertial navigation.
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Inertial navigation systems (INS) use internal gyros to
measure accelerations on the X, Y, and Z axes. By tracking
the accelerations in all three axes, a computer can
calculate the relative position of the units from a known
starting point (Farrell, 1999)
.
INS has been in use in SOF aircraft for decades. All
models of the MC-130 have navigation systems that include
INS. In addition, the MH-53J, the MH-47D/E, and the MH-60K
use INS as an integral part of their navigation solution.
Technology innovations have allowed INS units to achieve
higher accuracy at lower costs, but INS does have some
limitations. First, in order for an INS to provide accurate
navigational data, a precise starting position must be
entered into the INS computer. Currently, GPS is the best
source for an accurate starting position. Otherwise, the
starting location must be a presurveyed site with known
coordinates
.
Second, inertial navigation is not as accurate as GPS.
"A pure INS integrates differential equations containing
inertial measurements to provide a navigation solution. As
a result, small errors in the measurements can lead to large
velocity and position errors if allowed to integrate without
correction for long time periods" (Farrell, 1999, p.l). I
do not want to imply that INS is not an effective navigation
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aid. Integrated with GPS, INS can provide a highly accurate
navigation solution when GPS is intermittent or unavailable
in certain geographical areas. Unfortunately, INS is not
currently feasible for all SOF platforms, especially ground
units. SOF Technology Development is exploring personal
inertial navigation systems, but they are still in the
developmental stage (SOF Posture Statement, 1998). Even
with the technological innovation in INS development, the
size, weight, and power requirements of current INS systems
prevent their use by individual ground units (Farrell,
1999) .
D . SUMMARY
The Global Positioning System is integrated into every
aspect of military operations. This integration has been
mandated by Congress and embraced by all the services.
After a review of SOF navigation equipment and
interviews with SOF operators, I can only conclude that SOF
is moving toward dependence on GPS systems for position
orientation. This trend will increase as the culture
changes and GPS is accepted as a primary navigation aid.
Currently, emphasis is still placed on basic land
navigation, but the trend is more and more toward dependence
on GPS.
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GPS is vulnerable! GPS relies on a weak UHF radio
signal from a satellite located thousands of miles above the
earth's surface. Unintentional and intentional interference
is a concern wherever GPS is used. Although there has been
no evidence that any nation has intentionally interfered
with GPS signals to gain an advantage in time of conflict,
it does not mean that GPS jamming is not possible. The
capability to jam GPS signals is available to any buyer and
will only get better, especially if a market develops that
supports development in the industry.
Lastly, there are some substitutes to GPS navigation,
but those substitutes cannot provide the position and timing
accuracy in all the environments in which SOF must operate.
Technological innovation may enable internal navigation
systems to approach the accuracy of GPS, even for the
individual soldier, but that could be a long way in the
future
.
GPS passes the test of criticality. GPS is a
vulnerable technology that SOF is dependent on, yet there





Communications is vital to the successful conduct of
military operations on the modern battlefield. The modern
warfighting environment demands that forces operate
seamlessly in an ever expanding and multi-dimensional
battlefield. Only through timely and accurate information
can forces committed simultaneously to widely separated
objectives achieve the synergy necessary to shape the
battlespace and rapidly destroy or neutralize enemy centers
of gravity. Information is rapidly becoming a strategic
resource that soldiers depend on to execute their endless
variety of missions (Griffith, 1998).
There is no question that this trend will continue well
into the coming decades. The operational concepts of Joint
Vision 2010 include dominant maneuver and precision
engagement. Both concepts rely heavily on seamless
communications between dissimilar platforms over large
distances. Currently, the only way to effectively
communicate in this matter is via satellites.
Satellites permit direct communications on the
battlefield between widely dispersed units. No longer do
units have to maintain line-of-sight relay stations to
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ensure stable communications. Nor do they have to rely on
terrestrial networks 2 networks that are usually
insufficient or nonexistent in many parts of the world.
The development of satellite communications predated
the development of the GPS system but followed a similar
course. The objectives of communication research have been
to achieve ever-increasing ranges and capabilities while at
the same time reducing costs. Satellite communications were
the direct result of this research. The Second World War
prompted the development of two technologies that would
eventually lead to the era of satellite communications.
These technologies were missiles and microwaves. The
combinations of these technologies enabled satellite
communications to become a reality (Maral & Bousquet, 1998).
The space era started in 1957 when the Soviets launched
the first artificial satellite (Sputnik) . Only eight years
later, the first commercial geostationary satellite,
INTELSAT I, went into service and started a revolution in
worldwide communications that continues today (Maral &
Bousquet, 1998)
.
In just three short decades, all aspects of the
military have fully embraced satellite communications as an
2 Terrestrial systems use cable, including fiber optics, to
achieve connectivity between stations.
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integral part of tactical and strategic operations.
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM ushered in the
widespread use of satellite communications that continues
today. Over 1500 SATCOM terminals were eventually deployed
to the theater to provide the critical communication links
between dispersed forces in the absence of any
communications infrastructure across much of the area of
operations. Of the over 1500 terminals used, more than 75%
were single-channel man-portable military and commercial
units (Dunmeyer, 1997). Even with the military and
commercial systems, the operation lacked sufficient capacity
to support all the requirements for joint and combined
operations
.
The following background discussion will provide a
brief overview of military satellite communications and some
principles behind their operation. Although the discussion
addresses some technical subject matter, it is only
presented to provide a better understanding of satellite
communications and not a detailed analysis of the technical
aspects of satellite operations.
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B . BACKGROUND
The military satellite communications (MILSATCOM)
architecture is comprised of four segments (Pike, 1997).
The first segment is the ultra high frequency (UHF)
satellites that provide the bulk of the communications
capability to SOF ground, sea, and air forces (Pike) . This
segment consists of FLTSATCOM, AFSATCOM, LEASAT, and UHF
FollowOn (UFO) systems - all designed to support tactical
mobile forces. The super high frequency (SHF) Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) is the second segment
of MILSATCOM. DSCS supports high volume data transmission
for command and control functions. Satisfying the majority
of DoD' s medium and high data-rate communications, DSCS is
much less mobile than the UHF systems due to the size of the
user terminals and antennas. The third segment is the
Military Strategic/Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) system. MILSTAR
is designed to support strategic level command and control,
but will also provide additional capabilities for tactical
users. MILSTAR operates in the extremely high frequency
(EHF) range (Pike, 1997) . The fourth and final segment
consists of commercial communication satellites. Commercial
satellites are used to augment the DoD' s MILSATCOM
capabilities when demands require additional assets (Pike,
1997). INMARSAT is just one example of DoD' s use of
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commercial satellite systems to expand communication
capabilities
.
The focus of this research is the first segment of the
MILSATCOM architecture - tactical UHF satellite
communications. There are two reasons why UHF SATCOM is
being tested as a 'critical technology' . UHF SATCOM is used
much more than any other type of satellite communications
for connectivity of tactical units. UHF SATCOM provides the
backbone of long-range communications for SEALS, Special
Forces, and SOF aviation assets. Second, UHF SATCOM, due to
its signal characteristics, is the most vulnerable to enemy
countermeasures . In addition, tactical UHF satellite
terminals have proliferated throughout all the military
services, consequently, user requirements for UHF SATCOM are
greater than the resources available (Griffith, 1997).
The following sections describe how satellite
communication systems work. A basic understanding of SATCOM
is required to understand how it can be vulnerable and how
that vulnerability can be reduced.
1 . Satellite Operation and Components
Communication satellites are nothing more than a relay
station for radio signals placed on a very high x hill' . In
its simplest form, satellite communications involves the
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transmission of an RF signal from an earth-based station 3 to
the satellite (the uplink) , followed by the retransmission
from the satellite of another RF signal (the downlink) to a
different earth-based station (Leonard, 1999). The primary
components of a communication satellite are the receiver and
receive antenna, transmitter and transmit antenna, and a
power source. The capabilities and efficiency of a
satellite depend greatly on the freguency range, power
source and antenna design.













Table 4.1 Communications Satellite Frequency Bands
Ref. Griffith, 1998, p. 101.
From
2 . Frequency Bands
Military satellite communications operate in three
frequency bands - UHF, SHF, and EHF. The UHF frequency band
is used primarily for mobile and tactical satellite
3 An earth-based station is any terrestrial satellite
communications terminal including fixed or mobile ground




services. SHF satellite communications are more capable,
yet require larger terminals. EHF band communications are
currently being developed by both civilian and military
agencies that will provide even greater capacity, yet offer
the mobility of UHF systems.
An advantage of higher frequencies is greater
bandwidth. The greater the bandwidth, the greater the
information carrying capacity of the satellite channel. For
example, operating in the 4 - 6GHz frequency range provides
a bandwidth of 500 MHz, but operating in the 20 - 30 GHz
range provides bandwidths of 3500 MHz - a sevenfold increase
(Griffith, 1998). Greater bandwidths not only provide
faster data transfer, but they also provide improved jam
resistance. Additionally, larger bandwidths can be divided
into smaller segments enabling more users to use the same
channel. This process can involve numerous control
techniques such as Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), or Demand
Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) (Griffith, 1998)
.
3 . Orbits
Communication satellites can be deployed into one of
four types of orbit depending on the desired coverage, the
nature of the satellite' s mission, and the performance of
the launchers. The four orbits are geosynchronous
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(equatorial) orbits, elliptical orbits, low earth orbits
(LEO), and medium earth orbits (MEO) (Maral, 1998). Each
orbit type has unique advantages
.
The geosynchronous orbit is by the far the most
popular. There are currently more than 200 satellites in
geosynchronous orbit. The area above the North American
continent and the Atlantic Ocean is especially congested
(Maral, 1998). The orbit is called geosynchronous because
the "satellite thus appears as a fixed point in the sky and
ensures continuous operation as a radio relay in real time
for the area of visibility of the satellite" (Maral, p. 3).
Flying over the equator at an altitude of 35,786 km (23,300
miles) and at a speed equal to the earth's rotation, a
geostationary satellite can cover 42% of the earth's
surface. Only three satellites in geosynchronous orbit can
cover the entire earth except for the polar regions
(Leonard, 1999) .
The second type of orbit used for communications
satellites is the elliptical orbit. Elliptical orbits are
inclined at an angle of approximately 64 degrees with
respect to the equatorial plane (Maral, 1998) . An
elliptical orbit allows the satellite to cover the regions
of higher latitudes for extended periods as it proceeds to
its apogee. Three phased satellites on different orbits can
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provide continuous coverage of a selected polar region. For
example, the Russians use this type of orbit to ensure
coverage to even the most northern reaches of their
territory (Maral)
.
The last two orbits are the low earth orbit (LEO) and
the medium earth orbit (MEO) . The LEO has an altitude of
830 km and the orbit inclination varies based upon coverage
requirements. It would take a constellation of
approximately thirty satellites to provide worldwide
coverage. The MEO has an altitude of approximately 10,000
km. Only 10 to 15 satellites in a MEO are required to
provide the same worldwide coverage (Maral). Although many
more LEO satellites and MEO satellites are required to
maintain continuous coverage, the reduced power requirements
(due to the reduced distance between the ground station and
the satellite) enable the satellite to be much smaller and
less expensive and also reduces the power required by the
transmitting earth-station. In addition, it is much easier
to launch a satellite into a LOE or MOE than a
geosynchronous orbit.
The previous discussion is presented only as a primer
and only includes the most basic information required to




C. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AS A CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY
The contingency [communication] planner has many
options for C4ISR support, although satellite
communications remain the most important means for
connectivity. This is not expected to change
anytime soon. (Griffith, 1998, p. 87)
Reliable long-range communications are especially
important for SOF operations. Special operations forces are
often tasked to conduct a variety of missions far from
established communication networks. The often politically
sensitive nature of SOF operations requires reliable
communications to ensure connectivity between the operators
and the National Command Authority. Although SOF may
operate under the premise of 'centralized control and
decentralized execution' , it is unrealistic to think that
the NCA will not demand an ability to monitor the operation.
In addition, special operations forces can be tasked to
provide 'eyes on the target' when other means of
surveillance are unavailable. Special Reconnaissance (SR)
is a principal mission for SOF forces. Successful SR
demands the ability to communicate from any location and at
any time - a defining capability of satellite
communications. As previously mentioned, UHF SATCOM is the
only segment of the MILSATCOM system that will be examined
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as a 'critical technology' based upon the criteria of
dependence, vulnerability, and substitutability
.
1 . Dependence
Global mission requirements, greater information
transfer requirements, and rapidly increasing C4I
technological advances combine to place enormous
demands on SOF communications. (Griffith, 1997,
p. 2-2)
UHF SATCOM is used extensively by special ' operations
ground units and aviation units to provide essential
connectivity. Much like GPS usage, SATCOM usage is
difficult to accurately quantify due to the same reasons
mentioned in the previous chapter. To determine the level
of dependence on UHF SATCOM the same methods are used that
were used to establish GPS dependence. These methods
include a review of the long-range communications equipment
carried by SOF forces and informal interviews with SOF
operators from SEAL, SF, and STS ground units and Army and
Air Force aviation units. All SOF units require long-range
communications capability, but how the units employ this
capability varies a great deal.
Army Special Forces are normally required to carry four
long-range capable radios, though of course this can change
based on mission requirements. The four radios include UHF
SATCOM primary and backup and HF primary and backup. There
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is considerable emphasis by SF Command to ensure all SFODAs
are proficient using HF radios. SF Groups often require
each deployed team to make at least two contacts per week
via HF to ensure connectivity. Even with the emphasis on
HF, UHF SATCOM still accounts for a large majority of
communications , when channels are available. This is mainly
due to the greater ease of use and better capabilities of
SATCOM versus HF radios. Similar conditions are found in
other ground units.
Air Force Special Tactics personnel use and train with
HF much less than does Army SF. Frequently, HF radios are
not even carried by the teams, requiring a complete
dependence on SATCOM for ail long-range communications.
Considering that successful HF radio connectivity is often
dependent on user training and skill - it was even called an
*art' by one operator - units not regularly communicating
via HF will degrade that capability. There is no question
that STS is able to communicate via HF radios, but the less
comfortable the teams are with HF the less likely they will
be to use HF when SATCOM is degraded.
Navy SEALs also rely on UHF SATCOM for long-range
communications. Much like SF and STS, SEALS carry both HF
and UHF SATCOM radios, but the vast majority of the teams'
long-range communications are carried via SATCOM channels.
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All SOF aviation assets currently have UHF SATCOM
capability and rely on it much more than on HF. Until
recent modifications added a HF capability, versions of the
H-6 'Little Bird' only had a UHF SATCOM (Jackson, 1998)
.
The importance of UHF SATCOM was clearly demonstrated when
SOF forces deployed to Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.
Part of the contingent that deployed to Haiti as part
of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the 3 rd Special Forces
Group (SFG) . One of the 3 rd Group's responsibilities was to
provide security and assistance to the people throughout the
countryside. This required numerous SFODA teams to
establish operations in the remote regions of Haiti. After
years of internal strife, Haitian infrastructure was
devastated. No telephone service existed throughout the
island nation and few communities even had electricity. In
addition, the mountainous countryside made line-of-sight
communications virtually impossible. Satellite
Communications became the only reliable means for the teams
to send and receive information (Briefing by Colonel Mark
Boyatt, August 1999) . Colonel Mark Boyatt, the Army Special
Operations Task Force Commander in Haiti, relied on daily
UHF SATCOM broadcast to relay critical force protection
information to the widely dispersed SFODAs. Without UHF
SATCOM, the level of coordination between the SF teams would
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have been significantly reduced, thereby reducing overall
mission effectiveness.
2 . Vulnerability
As previously mentioned, UHF SATCOM is the workhouse of
the MILSATCOM system and accounts for the bulk of the
tactical capability provided to dispersed and highly mobile
SOF units. Unfortunately, UHF SATCOM is the most vulnerable
to detection, interception, and jamming (Griffith, 1998).
UHF SATCOM vulnerability is based not only on signal




Antenna design can have a significant impact on the
vulnerability of a SATCOM RF signal. There are two basic
antenna designs. The first is a spot beam - a focused RF
pattern sent only to a limited geographical area. The
second antenna pattern is the Earth Coverage (EC) beam.
Having a dispersed antenna pattern, the EC beam covers a
large geographical area. A jammer located anywhere in the
coverage area of an EC beam can induce noise on the uplink
signal used by the satellite. Since the UHF transponder
merely retransmits the same signal on the downlink with the
4 Although satellites can be vulnerable to other types of
threats such as physical destruction of the satellite or the
ground control stations, only electronic vulnerabilities are
discussed for the purpose of this thesis.
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same jammer induced noise, the retransmitted noise then
affects the entire area of the EC beam -- effectively
jamming the whole coverage area of the satellite in the
jammed frequency range.
The characteristics of the UHF signal make it more
vulnerable to jamming than the higher frequency bands. UHF,
with its small bandwidth, cannot effectively filter out
jammer induced noise without losing total or partial signal
integrity. The threat of electronic jamming is real and has
been developed over decades by the former Soviet Union.
The capability to jam UHF signals is widespread. In
the early 1970' s the Soviets developed a whole new type of
warfare - Radio Electronic Combat (REC) . Radio Electronic
Combat was integrated into all aspects of Soviet military
doctrine and became an integral part of the operations of
all the military services- (Chizum, 1985) . The legacy of the
Soviets' emphasis on REC is a mature capability that has
proliferated throughout the world. A review of classified
and unclassified sources reveals a plethora of jammers
capable of disrupting signals in the UHF spectrum.
The final aspect that makes UHF SATCOM vulnerable is
the sheer number of users trying to gain access to a limited
number of channels. "Tactical satellite terminal equipment
has proliferated within all the military services. As a
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consequence, user requirements for UHF SATCOM are normally
greater than the resources available to satisfy them"
(Griffith, 1998). The previous quote from the C4ISR
Handbook for Contingency Planning clarifies the problem.
Self-imposed 'jamming' through signal saturation may be just
as problematic as enemy jamming. Every operator interviewed
cited problems with SATCOM channel availability. There is
no guarantee that SOF units will get priority - possibly
forcing units to employ means other than UHF SATCOM for
long-range communications.
3. Substitutability
Although UHF SATCOM is presently the backbone of the
MILSATCOM system' s tactical communication capability, it is
not the only method of long-range communication for small,
dispersed units. To evaluate the substitutability of UHF
SATCOM, the following paragraphs will examine current long-
range communication capabilities, particularly by HF Radio,
and future systems that are in development that could
replace UHF SATCOM.
Before the advent of satellite communications, HF (High
Frequency) radio was the primary transmission means for
over-the-horizon communications (Griffith, 1998). Although
the military role of HF radio has diminished significantly
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over the last decade, it is still a viable, yet less capable
alternative
.
HF radio differs greatly from satellite communications
to achieve long range communications. HF radio works by
bouncing the RF signal off the ionized layers of the earth'
s
upper atmosphere. Layers of the ionosphere act as mirrors
to reflect the radio waves beyond the horizon in a somewhat
predictable manner (Griffith) . Although HF systems are less
expensive than satellite networks and recent technological
advances have made HF radio more reliable, HF radio still
has significant drawbacks when used in a military
environment
HF radio can support only a relatively small bandwidth.
Generally useful for only voice transmissions, HF radio can
accommodate limited data transfer, but only at a 300- 600
baud rate (Griffith) . HF radio is also vulnerable to enemy
direction finding and jamming. Since HF relies on bouncing
the RF signal off the atmosphere, weather patterns,
sunspots, man-made electronic noise, and other phenomena can
cause severe signal disruption or atmospheric blackout
(Griffith). Lastly, "HF is the most extensively used
.international frequency band, a fact that complicates the
frequency acquisition process" (p. 73). Not only do military
users have to compete among themselves for available
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frequencies, but they must compete with civilian users as
well
.
HF communications are also less suitable in a tactical
environment where mobility and speed are required. HF
radios often require much more time to setup and teardown
than UHF SATCOM systems. HF transmissions generally require
long antennas that must be stretched out above the ground
before transmissions can be made or received. This
increases a unit's signature and reduces its mobility.
HF radio remains a low-capacity alternative to
satellite communications for some applications, but HF radio
is not a substitute for the high band-width requirements of
special operations forces in our highly communications
intensive environment.
One system that is rapidly being developed that could
replace UHF SATCOM for- the tactical user is MILSTAR.
MILSTAR operates in the EHF portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum making it a much more capable and survivable
system.
First, the antenna design of the MILSTAR satellite
mitigates jammer effectiveness. The MILSTAR satellite,
transmitting in the EHF spectrum, has the capacity to use
multiple spot beams. Unlike the earth coverage antenna of
the UHF SATCOM systems, if a jammer is located within the
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spot beam, it affects only the area of the spot beam,
allowing the remaining coverage to be used normally.
Another feature of the EHF signal is the multiple
access control technigues employed by MILSTAR. One such
technique that is quite jam-resistant is Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) . CDMA is "a dynamic multiple access
technique where the total transponder bandwidth employs a
separate and distinct code for each user to access a traffic
channel at any instant in time. This technique is also
called spread spectrum (Griffith, 1998, p. 104). Without
the proper user code, the satellite transponder will not
accept the signal, therefore, it filters out the noise from
the jammer.
The higher frequencies, once again, allow much higher
bandwidths. The high bandwidths give EHF satellite
communications added jam-resistance. With such a wide
bandwidth, noise can be filtered out without losing the
original signal. The very wide EHF bandwidth allows it to
operate below the noise level induced by a RF jammer, making
it almost immune to induced noise.
Lastly, due to the highly directional antennas used
with EHF TACSAT communications radios, there is a low
probability of intercept and direction finding, unlike UHF
SATCOM antennas (Field Manual 24-11, 1990) . The Rockwell
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Corporation has developed an EHF man-portable terminal to
work with the MILSTAR system, but it weights almost thirty
pounds and is much bulkier than current portable UHF SATCOM
systems (Williamson, 1998 ) . Unfortunately, tactical MILSTAR
systems are not yet in use by tactical units.
Other commercial satellite systems offer promise as
substitutes for UHF SATCOM for the tactical user. Companies
such as Iridium, Teledesic, Globalstar, and Celestri are
developing systems to provide worldwide coverage using
small, mostly hand-held units (Griffith, 1998) . All of the
-
above systems use LOE or MEO satellite constellations. For
example, Iridium uses sixty-six satellites in low earth
orbit to maintain continuous coverage. Due to the large
number of satellites and the corresponding small coverage
area of each satellite, these systems will make it difficult
to effectively jam the transmissions.
D. SUMMARY
SATCOM is the only way to provide reliable, global
communications in a timely manner. Other means of
communications have inherent limitations. High frequency
radio lacks the reliability and the capacity required for
military operations. Line of sight radios have neither the
range required nor the ability to operate in all
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topographical areas. Finally, landlines are often not
available, take a long time to install, and are highly
vulnerable to disruption. Satellite communications have
become an integral part of DoD activities including special
operations. After examining the factors that define
critical technologies for SOF, it appears that UHF SATCOM is
a critical technology, but it may not remain so for long.
Special operations assets are dependent on UHF SATCOM
for reliable long-range communications. Every ground unit
and every aviation platform has a UHF SATCOM capability and
UHF SATCOM carries the vast majority of long-range
transmissions. Additionally, the primary substitute for UHF
SATCOM, HF, is being used less and less.
UHF SATCOM is vulnerable! The signal characteristics
and antenna design make UHF SATCOM the most vulnerable
military satellite system presently deployed. Countries
such as the former Soviet Union spent decades developing and
maturing systems designed to disrupt the UHF portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum. It would be unwise to think that
this knowledge has not proliferated to other potential
adversaries. The last area of vulnerability for UHF SATCOM
is channel saturation. UHF SATCOM channel availability is
not expanding as rapidly as user demand. Too many users
75
trying to use too few channels can be just as disruptive as
enemy jamming.
Currently, there may be no substitutes for UHF SATCOM
for the individual SOF operator, except the less capable HF
radio. However, this is changing fast. With the advances
in telecommunications UHF SATCOM, with its inherent
limitations, will be replaced by much more capable and
secure systems such as man-portable MILSTAR terminals or
other commercial systems that are more mobile and less
susceptible to disruption.
Special operations tactical units are dependent upon
UHF SATCOM for long-range communications and the system is
vulnerable to disruption by an adversary and from our own
overuse. What will soon change is the substitutability of
UHF SATCOM. Other more secure and reliable systems are
being deployed that will have the capacity to meet the
increasing demand for satellite communications on the modern
battlefield.
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V. SUMMARY/ FINDINGS/ RECOMMENDATONS
When war is transformed, it can be
transformed for all belligerents. A national lead
is possible, indeed it is a fact for the United
States today, but a permanent national lead is not
certain. Moreover, even if (improbably) the
United States alone can enjoy the benefits of
space age information warfare for the next several
decades, enemies will be motivated to find ways to
restrict the domain of information led military
advantage. (Gray, 1996)
A. SUMMARY
Technology and continued technological advancement are
essential to modern warfighting and will continue to be so
as advancements in navigation, communication, mobility,
logistics, and intelligence continue at an ever increasing
pace. Superior technology has provided the United States
military, including special operations forces, with
significant advantages over our adversaries in recent
conflicts, but the United States cannot and must not become
comfortable with the advantages we currently maintain.
Additionally, the United States must guard against relying
on technologies that are vulnerable to enemy actions. This
thesis proposed a model that can be used by all levels -
strategic, operational, and tactical - to evaluate our use
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of technologies to determine if they are critical to
successful mission accomplishment.
The previous case studies were used to illustrate the
concept of criticality presented in the first chapter. For
a technology to be considered critical it must first be
evaluated against three factors - dependence, vulnerability,
and substitutability . Dependence is satisfied if the
technology is required to perform the mission or the absence
of a given technology will significantly decrease expected
mission effectiveness. Second, for a technology to be
considered vulnerable it must be reasonably susceptible to
enemy exploitation, degradation, or destruction. Lastly,
the technology cannot have any readily available substitutes
that can replace it without loss of mission effectiveness or
increased risk to the users. None of these variables are
easily quantifiable. All require subjective judgements on a
case-by-case basis to determine if the criteria are met and
in what circumstances.
The purpose of this thesis is not to discount the
relative advantages technological innovation provides SOF on
the battlefield. Nor does this thesis promote a change in
course away from technology as a means to gain an advantage.
By developing the model and applying it to a historical case
and two current cases, I hope to encourage special
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operations forces at all levels to look beyond the immediate
advantage of a technology. War is a dynamic, interactive
process in which both sides are trying to out-maneuver,
outwit, and overcome their adversary's forces over time. A
technological advantage or capability enjoyed at the onset
of the conflict may not be available at the end. Presently,
no adversary is capable of challenging the United States
directly, therefore, we can only assume that our adversaries
will use asymmetric strategies to avoid our strengths and
exploit our weaknesses (Edwards, 1997). The model developed
in this thesis provides a framework from which to evaluate
current and future technologies to determine if a technology
can be exploited and turned into a weakness for the US.
B. FINDINGS
Radar, GPS, and UHF SATCOM are by no means the only
cases of critical technologies. They are only used to
illustrate how technologies can and should be evaluated, not
only once deployed, but also during the development and
procurement stages. The current examples used in this thesis
and the method in which they were evaluated are at the
tactical level of employment only, but the critical
technology model developed in this thesis can be used for
every level of combat analysis - strategic, operational, or
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tactical. Other technologies that could fall into these
categories and may be considered critical might include
those supporting the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS) , stealth technology, tactical and strategic mobility,
and any commercial-of f-the -shelf (COTS) items that can be
acquired, evaluated, and possibly exploited by any one of
our adversaries.
Probably the biggest question is: why should we be
worried? No country has been able to challenge the US
technologically and there are very few countries in the
world that have demonstrated the potential to do so. No
nation has conducted widespread jamming of the GPS signal in
an effort to disrupt our military activities. The same can
be said about UHF SATCOM. Disrupting or degrading GPS or
UHF SATCOM certainly can be done, but it would take an
adversary with sufficient resources and sophistication to do
so in an effective and sustained manner. Furthermore, we
have substitute technologies or techniques in many cases
that will allow our forces to operate in some capacity. The
answer, of course, is that just because an enemy has not
struck at a critical technology does not mean one will not.
If the enemy does strike, will we be ready for the
consequences? The next section takes this point to the
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extreme, but in doing so it illustrates our potential
technological vulnerabilities.
1. Electro-magnetic Pulse
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the effects of EMP have
been recognized for over three decades. The first evidence
of EMP effects occurred when the US detonated an atomic
device above Johnson Island in July 1962. Just seconds
after the blast, the Hawaiian Islands, over 800 miles to the
northeast, experienced severe electrical problems including
tripped burglar alarms, tripped circuit breakers, and
extensive power outages (McGrath, 1992). EMP is a real and
dangerous phenomenon.
Electromagnetic pulse is a high voltage burst of
energy, much like a lightning bolt. The pulse lasts for
just a fraction of a second but can render unprotected
electronics useless, especially modern electronics. As
circuits get smaller and smaller and required voltages are
reduced, the possible effects of EMP are even greater. EMP
can cause a variety of adverse effects. In the case of
digital logic circuits, these effects can include transient,
resettable, or permanent damage. The damage can be caused
directly by the collected EMP resulting in system failure,
or EMP can trigger internal power sources to respond in
unintended ways that can also cause system failure (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1997). If electronic equipment is
turned off, it is less likely to be damaged. If the
equipment is turned on, the rapid increase in current will
cause every semiconductor to go into overdrive and overheat
(Edwards, 1997)
.
There are two general types of EMP - nuclear and non-
nuclear. The first and most common type is electromagnetic
pulse produced from the detonation of a nuclear device. The
physics of how the pulse is produced from the nuclear
reaction is beyond the scope of this study, but a few
factors concerning bomb delivery are relevant. The amount
of EMP experienced by electronic systems depends on weapon
yield, location of burst, altitude of burst, and type of
weapon (U.S. House of Representatives, 1997). Basically,
anything within line of sight of the blast can be affected.
For example, a high yield weapon detonated 250 miles above
the center of the continental United States would affect
electronics from coast to coast (U.S. House of
Representatives). The likelihood of an adversary detonating
a nuclear device over the US is, admittedly, small. Not
only does a state have to develop a warhead; it must also
have a delivery vehicle capable of achieving sufficient
altitude and distance to maximize effectiveness. The more
likely scenario could involve detonating a nuclear device
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over US forces prior to, or instead of, a conventional
attack (Edwards, 1997). This scenario would require a much
smaller warhead and a much less sophisticated delivery
platform. Due to our high reliance on the microchip in
almost every platform and piece of communication gear, much
of our military capability would be devastated, yet not one
building would be destroyed, nor would any US soldier be
killed. Conversely, an enemy well prepared for an EMP event
can protect its equipment and significantly reduce the
effects. Will the U.S. then have enough justification to
retaliate in kind if the adversary's "clean" use of a
nuclear weapon did not directly injure a single U.S. soldier
(Edwards, 1997)? This is the dilemma of nuclear EMP.
Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse should also concern
US forces. The physics behind nuclear and non-nuclear EMP
differ, but the results are similar although different in
scale. Non-nuclear EMP weapons use complex explosives to
generate a powerful, yet short lived, electrical field
(Kopp, 1997) . The footprint of non-nuclear EMP devices is
considerably smaller than that of a nuclear device. Non-
nuclear devices may affect areas of tens of meters to
several hundreds of meters in radius (Kopp). Possible
targets are tactical operations centers, communications
nodes, or Corps/ Wing level headquarters. Non-nuclear EMP
weapons are not only technically feasible, but also
relatively inexpensive to build when compared to the costs
associated with a nuclear weapons program. Due to the
relatively isolated effects of non-nuclear EMP weapons, they
are not currently able to devastate a theater force.
However, they do not have to. Even temporary disruption of
our electronics by EMP may be enough to change the course of
the battle.
EMP effects can be mitigated. Electronic devices can
be hardened against EMP. If EMP hardening is built in from
the start, the costs of EMP hardening can be as little as 1-
5% of total system costs (U.S. House of Representatives,
1997). If done after the fact, the costs are significantly
higher. Some military systems are hardened against EMP, but
considering that 95% of all military communications go
through commercial channels, the expense of hardening all
COTS systems would be unreasonable.
Considering the effects of Electro-magnetic pulse, we
must assume that any unhardened piece of electronics is
potentially vulnerable. It is also clear that all U.S.
forces are becoming increasingly reliant on advanced
technologies in almost every aspect of military operations -
during peacetime and in war. Not all technologies will be
considered critical, but many will.
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C . RECOMMENDATIONS
This research would not be complete without some
recommendations concerning critical technologies. No
technology should be "critical" to mission accomplishment,
but due to the wide variety and complexity of special
operations missions there may be no way to avoid dependence
on some vulnerable technologies. There are two methods to
mitigate the risks posed by critical technologies. One
method is to develop technological fixes and redundant
systems. The second method is to develop doctrinal offsets.
Of the three factors that define critical technologies,
substitutability can be addressed through advanced
technological development to provide redundancy for all
systems. SOF is active in pursuing this course. By
considering only the two recent cases presented in this
thesis, we can see that SOF has an ongoing research and
development effort in many areas of long-range
communications. Advances in HF radio are making these
radios more capable and easier to use. In addition,
satellite systems using a different frequency bands and
employing varying orbital configurations are being developed
to supplement UHF SATCOM and reduce vulnerabilities. By
having so many redundant systems, we can possibly take UHF
SATCOM off the critical list.
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Advances in precision navigation methods are not likely
to replace GPS in the near future. Here too, USSOCOM is
actively exploring alternates to GPS, such as INS units for
individual soldiers, but much more has to be done in this
field to make it possible. Technology cannot be the only
fix to the problem. As I have argued before, we must
realize that a motivated and creative adversary can develop
countermeasures to our new technologies. The United States
cannot assume that the technological advantage we enjoy
today will last forever.
The other method for addressing the criticality issue
is through doctrinal changes and training. Joint doctrine
should address the loss of significant capabilities.
Tactics, techniques, and procedures should be developed to
ensure continued operations if communication, navigation,
computing, or mobility capabilities are lost or
significantly degraded. Obviously, operations will not
continue as before and a decrease in effectiveness should be
expected. Yet, with proper planning, operations should not
cease
.
Coinciding closely with doctrine is a training program
to test SOF' s capabilities in a degraded environment. Once
doctrine is developed, it must be put into practice through
training exercises that simulate the loss of a critical
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technology. As I previously stated, I have found no
evidence that SOF has been forced to operate without GPS
during any major exercise. Doctrine cannot be written and
training exercises cannot be conducted to prepare for the
loss of every technology applicable to special operations.
It will be up to individual commanders to decide which
technologies are most critical based on mission requirements
and the operating environment -- only then can contingency
plans and training programs be developed to deal with the
technology loss.
The United States can never assume a continuous
technological advantage. Worldwide technology proliferation
and the rapid advancement of computing capability allows any
nation to obtain significant technical capabilities at
relatively low cost and possibly faster than our own
acquisition system allows. SOF must continue to innovate and
diversify- as it has in the past - in order to remain a
competitive force. However, the innovation and
diversification cannot only be in technology. They must
also be in doctrine and training to ensure continued
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